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hoped, therefore, that the Riefberg decision will not frustrate the
legislature's intention to clarify this area of the law.
Lisa Schreibersdorf

GENERAL BusINEss LAW

Gen. Bus. Law § 200: Court of Appeals held that whether an innkeeper has complied with the safe requirement of section 200 is a
question of fact for the jury
Section 200 of the General Business Law7 8 operates in deroga-

tion of the common-law rule that innkeepers are absolutely liable
ment, stock bonus, profit sharing, and insurance arrangements as well as inter vivos gifts,
irrevocable trusts, deeds of real property and gifts of U.S. Savings Bonds. Kleinerman, 66
Misc. 2d at 570, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 906. The Surrogate found significant the fact that the
legislature set the effective date of the statute 14 months from the date of enactment, presumably to allow testators an opportunity to arrange their affairs so as to avoid the statute's
operation. Id. at 571, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 906. The court also emphasized that the act of disinheriting one's spouse is indicative of a deteriorated marital relationship. Id. at 570, 219
N.Y.S.2d at 906. Hence, the court concluded that accounts created before August 31, 1966,
retain their character as exempt gifts unless the amount and/or beneficiary changed. Id. at
571, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 906-07.
171 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 200 (McKinney 1968). Section 200 of the General Business
Law provides, in pertinent part:
Whenever the proprietor or manager of any hotel... shall provide a safe in
the office of such hotel,. . . or other convenient place for the safe keeping of any
money, jewels, ornaments, bank notes, bonds, negotiable securities or precious
stones, belonging to the guests ... and shall notify the guests or travelers thereof
by posting a notice stating the fact that such safe is provided,. . . in a public and
conspicuous place and manner in the office and public rooms ... of such hotel,
...if such guest or traveler shall neglect to deliver such property, to the person
in charge of such office for deposit in such safe, the proprietor . . . shall not be
liable for any loss. . . and if such guest or traveler shall deliver such property, to
the person in charge of such office for deposit in such safe, said proprietor, ...
shall not be liable for any loss thereof, sustained. . . by theft or otherwise, in any
sum exceeding the sum of five hundred dollars unless by special agreement in
writing ....
Id. Section 200 is designed to protect the innkeeper from "undisclosed excessive liability."
Millhiser v. Beau Site Co., 251 N.Y. 290, 294, 167 N.E. 447, 448 (1929); see infra note 205
and accompanying text. It should be noted, however, that the statute does not establish new
innkeeper liability, but rather assumes the existence of absolute common-law liability.
Navagh, A New Look at the Liability of Inn Keepers for Guest Property Under New York
Law, 25 FORDHAM L. REv. 62, 64 (1956). Thus, where strict compliance with the statutory
requirement has not been observed, the common-law rule will control. Davidson v. Madison
Corp., 231 App. Div. 421, 426, 247 N.Y.S. 789, 796 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 257 N.Y. 120, 177 N.E.
393 (1931); Shaine v. Jacobson, Inc., 121 Misc. 590, 591, 201 N.Y.S. 781, 781 (Sup. Ct. Spec.
T. N.Y. County 1923).
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for the property of their guests.179 It does so by limiting such liability to $500180 for innkeepers who comply with the statutory requirements that a "safe" be provided for storage of patrons' valuables and that notice be posted indicating the availability of the
safe.1 "' New York courts rarely have had occasion to evaluate the
17 See Zaldin v. Concord Hotel, 48 N.Y.2d 107, 111-12, 397 N.E.2d 370, 371-72, 421
N.Y.S.2d 858, 860-61 (1979); Epp v. Bowman-Biltmore Hotels Corp., 171 Misc. 338, 339, 12
N.Y.S.2d 384, 385 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. N.Y. County 1939); see also Navagh, supra note 178, at
62-63; Taylor, Innkeeper, Guest and Outlaw: A Very Old Triangle,21 S. TEx. L.J. 355, 35660 (1980). The common-law rule provides that innkeepers are absolutely liable, as insurers,
for the property of their guests, Zaldin, 48 N.Y.2d at 112, 397 N.E.2d at 372, 421 N.Y.S.2d
at 861, and that an innkeeper can absolve himself from liability only by showing that the
loss or damage was attributable to the guest's negligence or fraud, an act of God, or the
public enemy, see Davidson v. Madison Corp., 231 App. Div. 421, 425-26, 247 N.Y.S. 789,
795 (1st Dep't), affd, 257 N.Y. 120, 177 N.E. 393 (1931). While the common-law rule apparently was severe, it was not considered unjust, see Wilkins v. Earle, 44 N.Y. 172, 178 (1870),
since the traveler was relying on the protection of an "unknown host who sometimes proved
unworthy of the trust," Navagh, supra note 178, at 63. Moreover, innkeepers compensated
for the risk of loss by adjusting their fees in accordance with the severity of the risks encountered. Wilkins, 44 N.Y. at 178.
Although the common-law rule persisted for some time, changing societal conditions
hastened a judicial reevaluation of the rule of absolute innkeeper liability. Zaldin, 48 N.Y.2d
at 112, 397 N.E.2d at 372, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 861. For example, as a result of the development
of more advanced transportation systems, travel became more frequent, better patrolled
and, hence, less dangerous. Navagh, supra note 178, at 62. Accordingly, the need for innkeeper protection lessened. See Zaldin, 48 N.Y.2d at 112, 397 N.E.2d at 372, 421 N.Y.S.2d
at 861; Navagh, supra note 178, at 63-64. When it became increasingly unfair to impose
absolute liability upon an innkeeper, New York and many other states that previously had
adhered to the common-law rule enacted legislation to limit the innkeeper's liability for lost,
damaged or stolen goods. Navagh, supra note 178, at 63-64; see, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §
200 (McKinney 1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 29:2-2 (West 1981); 37 PA. CONs. STAT. ANN. § 61
(Purdon 1954).
180 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 200 (McKinney 1968). The statutory limitation is contingent
upon compliance with the safe and notice requirements. See Zaldin, 48 N.Y.2d at 111, 397
N.E.2d at 371, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 860. Thus, the maximum liability is $500, regardless of how
the loss is sustained. Id. Such liability may be changed, however, by express agreement
between the guest and the hotel. Id. The innkeeper will only be liable for the loss, theft, or
destruction of those goods enumerated in the statute. See id.; Navagh, supra note 178, at
65. Section 200 lists seven items for which an innkeeper will be liable: "money, jewels, ornaments, bank notes, bonds, negotiable securities or precious stones, belonging to the guests..
. ." N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 200 (McKinney 1968). The statutory specification of items warranting innkeeper protection contrasts sharply with the responsibility imposed upon innkeepers at common law. Compare N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 200 (McKinney 1968) with J.
SCHOULER, THE LAW OF BAILMENTS § 237 (1905). At common law, the innkeeper's liability
extended "to wearing apparel, jewelry, money, and even to the horses, wheat, butter and
other articles of bulk belonging to the guest...." Davidson v. Madison Corp., 231 App. Div.
421, 426, 247 N.Y.S. 789, 795 (1st Dep't) (quoting Wilkins v. Earle, 44 N.Y. 172, 178 (1870)),
afl'd, 257 N.Y. 120, 177 N.E. 393 (1931).
181 See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 200 (McKinney 1968). Where a safe is unavailable for the
guest's use, an innkeeper will not be entitled to statutory protection. See Zaldin, 48 N.Y.2d
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scope of the statutory terminology, and have labeled section 200
"free from ambiguity." 182 Recently, however, in Goncalves v. Regent International Hotels, Ltd.,18 3 the Court of Appeals established a standard by which a jury could factually determine
whether a particular safe satisfied the requirements of section
200.184
In Goncalves, two guests of the defendant, the Mayfair Regent
Hotel, delivered jewelry valued at approximately two million dollars to the hotel management for storage in a safe.1 85 Thieves subsequently broke into the hotel's safe-deposit room and removed all
the valuables stored therein.""' The plaintiffs brought separate actions, alleging that the safe-deposit room was inadequately secured
and hence, that it was not a "safe" within the meaning of section
200.187 The defendant offered its compliance with section 200 as an
at 113-14, 397 N.E.2d at 373, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 862. Even if a safe is provided, the innkeeper
will not be entitled to limited liability if he fails to give sufficient notice that the safe is
available for the storage of guests' valuables. See, e.g., DePaemelaere v. Davis, 77 Misc. 2d 1,
4-5, 351 N.Y.S.2d 808, 811-12 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1973) (not only must the notice
be conspicuous, it must set forth the innkeeper's limited liability), af'd, 79 Misc. 2d 800,
363 N.Y.S.2d 323 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1974). Thus, notice must be posted in a "public and conspicuous place and manner." N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 200 (McKinney 1968). Indeed, it has been held insufficient to post notice only in the hotel's bedrooms, see Insurance
Co. of N. Am., Inc. v. Holiday Inns of Am., Inc., 40 App. Div. 2d 885, 885, 337 N.Y.S.2d 68,
69-70 (3d Dep't 1972), or at the head of every registration card signed by a guest, see Epp v.
Bowman-Biltmore Hotels Corp., 171 Misc. 338, 338-39, 12 N.Y.S.2d 384, 385 (N.Y.C. Mun.
Ct. N.Y. County 1939). In addition to the "public and conspicuous" requirement, the statute
requires that the text of the notice state the terms of the innkeeper's liability. See Millhiser
v. Beau Site Co., 251 N.Y. 290, 296, 167 N.E. 447, 449 (1929).
'8' Zaldin, 48 N.Y.2d at 113, 397 N.E.2d at 372-73, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 862.
183 58 N.Y.2d 206, 447 N.E.2d 693, 460 N.Y.S.2d 750 (1983).
184 Id. at 217, 447 N.E.2d at 698-99, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 755-56; see infra notes 196-97 and
accompanying text.
186 58 N.Y.2d at 211, 447 N.E.2d at 695, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 752. Upon delivering their
jewelry to the hotel management, both plaintiffs signed a "Safe Deposit Receipt." Id. The
receipt set forth the hotel's disclaimer of liability for any damage or loss exceeding $500, id.
at 211 & n.1, 447 N.E.2d at 695 & n.1, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 752 & n.1, and limited each plaintiff's allowable deposit value to $500, id. Thereafter, each plaintiff was given a key to the
deposit box. Id.
188 Id. at 212, 447 N.E.2d at 696, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 753. The "safe" provided by the hotel
consisted of rows of safe-deposit boxes located in a room constructed of plasterboard. Id.,
447 N.E.2d at 695, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 752. The room had two entrance doors made of hollowcore wood, only one of which was locked. Id., 447 N.E.2d at 696, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 753. Access
to the individual boxes could be obtained only with the use of two keys. Id., 447 N.E.2d at
695-96, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 752-53. Each guest received one key to the safe-deposit box and the
hotel retained possession of the other. Id., 447 N.E.2d at 695, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 752.
28- Id., 447 N.E.2d at 696, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 753. Both plaintiffs alleged that the safedeposit room was unlocked and unattended at the time of the theft, but advanced different
theories of liability. Goncalves advanced four theories of relief: "gross negligence in provid-
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affirmative defense limiting its liability to the plaintiffs."' 8 In a
consolidated action, the Supreme Court, Special Term, determined
as a matter of law that the defendant had complied with the statute and therefore was entitled to the protection of the liabilitylimiting provision of section 200.189 Consequently, each plaintiff's
recovery was limited to $500.19' The Appellate Division, First Department, unanimously affirmed.1 '
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the lower court's
decision, 9 2 holding that Special Term had erred in failing to submit to the jury the question of whether the defendant's safe satisfied the statutory criteria. 19 3 Writing for a divided Court,1 94 Chief

Judge Cooke observed that since section 200 operates in derogation
of the common law, strict construction of the statute is man-

dated.1 95 Accordingly, the Court determined that a hotel must
provide a security system that would "adequately" protect stored

items "against fire, theft, and other reasonably foreseeable
risks."19 Reasoning that it would be improper to specify one type
ing security"; "breach of contract by the defendants' failure to fulfill an earlier promise to
install a secure area for their safe-deposit boxes"; "breach of duty as a bailee"; and "breach
of section 200 of the General Business Law by the defendants' failure to provide a safe as
required by that statute." Id. The other plaintiff, Cecconi, sought relief under two theories:
"(1) breach of duty as a bailee; and (2) negligence in providing security." Id.
'$g Id. The defendant raised three affirmative defenses: first, that section 200 of the
General Business Law limited the plaintiffs' recovery to $500; second, that the plaintiffs
breached the safe-deposit agreements by depositing goods worth more than $500; and third,
that the agreement, even without the statutory limitation, limited the hotel's liability to
$500. Id.
Id. at 213, 447 N.E.2d at 696, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 753.
19
191

Id.
Id.

192 Id. at 217-20, 447 N.E.2d at 701, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 758. The Court granted the plaintiff's cross-motions to dismiss the defendant's second and third affirmative defenses, denied
the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. Id.
293 Id. at 219-21, 447 N.E.2d at 699-700, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 756-57.
194Chief Judge Cooke authored the majority opinion, in which Judges Wachtler, Fuchsberg, and Meyer concurred. Judge Jasen, joined by Judges Jones and Simons, dissented.
19 58 N.Y.2d at 215, 447 N.E.2d at 697, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 754; see 2B WARREN's NEGLIGENCE IN THE NEw YORK COURTS § 6.02[3], at 603 (4th ed. 1980); Pound, Common Law and
Legislation, 21 HARv. L. REV. 383, 386 (1908). While several justifications have been proffered for adhering to the rule requiring strict construction of statutes in derogation of the
common law, perhaps the most persuasive reason is that the common law represents the
"consummation of man's experiences" and thus is not to be readily discounted. E. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 490-91 (1940). Overly strict construction of a statute,
however, may operate to contravene legislative intent. See Pound, supra, at 385-86.
199 58 N.Y.2d at 217, 447 N.E.2d at 698-99, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 755-56. Focusing on the
common-law need for public compensation, the Court rejected the defendant's assertion
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of safe that would satisfy this standard, Chief Judge Cooke concluded that such a determination is more appropriately left to the
197
trier of fact.

Dissenting, Judge Jasen maintained that the definition of the
word "safe" is a matter of statutory construction that should be
left to the discretion of a court.19 Judge Jasen asserted that the
legislature intended that any safe capable of protecting $500 worth
of property would be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of section 200."o Accordingly, the dissent concluded that the defendant's
that section 200 authorizes a hotel to provide either a "safe" or another convenient place for
the storage of valuables. Id. at 219, 447 N.E.2d at 700, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 757. Such an interpretation, the majority stressed, "would allow a box or a bag kept behind the counter or a
common coat closet to be interchangeable with a state-of-the-art steel vault" and would be
in complete contravention of the policy underlying the statute. Id.
197 Id. at 217-18, 447 N.E.2d at 698-99, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 755-56. The Court stated that it
merely was "providing a standard where the Legislature ha[d] not, [and] leaving application
of that standard to the fact finder." Id. at 218, 447 N.E.2d at 699, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 756.
Since the security needs of different hotels vary, such an approach was warranted. Id. at
217, 447 N.E.2d at 698, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 755. More specifically, Chief Judge Cooke maintained that "[a] large, luxury hotel has far different security needs than a small, low-priced
motel catering to a different clientele." Id. Accordingly, the Court noted that "all aspects of
the hotel's security system may be considered" in determining whether a receptacle is a
"safe" under section 200. Id., 447 N.E.2d at 699, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 756.
With respect to the defendant's affirmative defenses, the Court determined that the
enforceability of the agreements contained in the safe-deposit receipt could be decided without addressing the defendant's compliance with section 200. Id. at 219-20, 447 N.E.2d at
700, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 757. The Court concluded that, regardless of the defendant's compliance with section 200, the contracts were unenforceable for lack of consideration, since the
defendant merely was fulfilling a statutory obligation. Id. at 220, 447 N.E.2d at 700, 460
N.Y.S.2d at 757. Conversely, if the defendant did not otherwise satisfy the requirements of
section 200, such agreements would be void as against public policy because they "would
encourage hotels to provide lesser protection than is required by the statute." Id.
108 Id. at 225-26, 447 N.E.2d at 703, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 760 (Jasen, J., dissenting). The
construction or interpretation of the terms of a statute is always a question for the court.
See N.Y. STATUTES § 75(a) (McKinney 1971); de Sloov~re, The Functions of Judge and

Jury in the Interpretationof Statutes, 46 HRv. L. REv. 1086, 1086-87 (1933). Judge Jasen
asserted that if the meaning of the word "safe" was left "to be decided on an ad hoc basis
by a jury rather than the courts, the availability to hotels of the statutory limitation of
liability would be subject to the vagaries of a body of lay individuals possessing no training
or expertise in the task of discerning and applying legislative intent ... " 58 N.Y.2d at
223, 447 N.E.2d at 702, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 759 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
199 58 N.Y.2d at 226-27, 447 N.E.2d at 704, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 761 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
Judge Jasen reasoned that since the legislature intended to insulate innkeepers from absolute liability by limiting the amount recoverable by an injured plaintiff to $500, it would be
illogical to require hotels to receive and secure goods worth more than that amount. Id. at
226-28, 447 N.E.2d at 704-05, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 761-62 (Jasen, J., dissenting). Further, the
dissent asserted that the legislature could not have intended a hotel to "install the same
type of safes and vaults used by banks and other institutions that are responsible for safeguarding valuables worth millions of dollars merely to safeguard $500 worth of property."
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"safe" should have been deemed adequate as a matter of law.200
It is submitted that the Court of Appeals' decision to leave the
determination of statutory compliance with the safe requirement
of section 200 to the discretion of the jury was improper in that the
Court failed to heed the logic of prior judicial constructions as well
as the legislature's intent in enacting the statute. Historically, New
York courts have refrained from submitting the construction of
section 200 to the jury.201 Indeed, despite an initial pronouncement
that compliance with the statute's corollary requirement of posting
notice was a question of fact, 02 the courts consistently have declined to present the issue of compliance to the jury, determining
as a matter of law whether notice actually was posted. 03 Moreover,
Id. at 226-27, 447 N.E.2d at 704, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 761 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
200

Id.

at 228, 447 N.E.2d at 705, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 762 (Jasen, J., dissenting). The dis-

sent conceded that the agreements limiting the hotel's liability were unenforceable. Id. at
229-30, 447 N.E.2d at 706, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 763 (Jasen, J., dissenting). Although concurring
in the majority's conclusion regarding the agreements, Judge Jasen asserted that "[t]o suggest that the promise of the hotels could not serve as consideration because it merely restated their statutory obligation is incorrect." Id. at 230, 447 N.E.2d at 706, 460 N.Y.S.2d at
763 (Jasen, J., dissenting). Rather, the dissent posited that the promise of the hotel to provide a safe for the storage of guests' valuables was sufficient consideration to form a binding
contract. Id. (Jasen, J., dissenting). However, Judge Jasen determined that the contract was
one of "exoneration rather than of indemnity," and did not operate to relieve the hotel of
liability for its own negligence in the absence of an explicit disclaimer. Id. (Jasen, J.,
dissenting).
101 See, e.g., Salisbury v. St. Regis-Sheraton Hotel Corp., 490 F. Supp. 449, 451
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (as a matter of law plaintiff was a "guest"); Ramaley v. Leland, 43 N.Y. 539,
542 (1871) (whether a watch was a "jewel" or an "ornament" decided by the court); Spiller
v. Barclay Hotel, 68 Misc. 2d 400, 401, 327 N.Y.S.2d 426, 428 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County
1972) (court found as a matter of law that patron was a "guest"); Federal Ins. Co. v. Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, 60 Misc. 2d 996, 999, 303 N.Y.S.2d 297, 301 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y.
County 1969) (court determines whether cufflinks are "jewels"). For example, in an early
attempt to define what would constitute "jewels or ornaments" under section 200, the Court
of Appeals held that items worn as "ornaments" come under the statutory category, but
that items "carried for use and convenience" do not. Ramaley, 43 N.Y. at 542; see, e.g.,
Spiller, 68 Misc. 2d at 401, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 428; Federal Ins. Co., 60 Misc. 2d at 997-98, 303
N.Y.S.2d at 296-97; see also Salisbury, 490 F. Supp. at 451 (interpreting New York law and
determining as a matter of law whether a plaintiff was a guest within the meaning of section

200).
202 See Peters v. Knott Corp., 191 Misc. 898, 899, 82 N.Y.S.2d 650, 651 (Sup. Ct. App.
T. 2d Dep't 1948).
202 See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am., Inc. v. Holiday Inns of Am., Inc., 40 App. Div. 2d
885, 885, 337 N.Y.S.2d 68, 70 (3d Dep't 1972); DePaemelaere v. Davis, 77 Misc. 2d 1, 3-5,
351 N.Y.S.2d 808, 810-12 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1973), aff'd, 79 Misc. 2d 800, 363
N.Y.S.2d 323 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1974); Epp v. Bowman-Biltmore Hotels Corp., 171
Misc. 338, 342, 12 N.Y.S.2d 384, 388 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. N.Y. County 1939). In Epp, the
defendant had "posted" notice of the availability of the hotel's safe on registration cards,
which were to be signed by each guest upon registration. 171 Misc. at 338-39, 12 N.Y.S.2d at
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irrespective of the conceptual soundness of considering the varied
needs of different inns, the validity of such ad hoc determinations
is questionable in light of the Court's express recognition that section 200 was not intended to have discriminatory application for
large and small hotels.20 4
The intent of the legislature in enacting section 200 evidently
was to safeguard against the undisclosed, excessive hotel liability
385, The plaintiff, whose goods had been stolen from her room, claimed that such warning
was an insufficient "posting" as required by section 200 and sued for the full value of her
lost money and personal property. Id. Concluding that the term "post" as used in the statute means to "nail, attach, affix or otherwise fasten up physically and to display in a conspicuous manner," id. at 342, 12 N.Y.S.2d at 388, the Court held that "a posting is not made
by printing or recording a notice in a book or on a card and keeping it on a desk," without
submitting the issue to the jury, id.; cf. Waitt Constr. Co. v. Chase, 197 App. Div. 327, 331,
188 N.Y.S. 589, 592 (1st Dep't 1921) ("hotel" means a house held out to the public as a
place where transient persons will be received as guests for compensation), afl'd mem., 233
N.Y. 633, 135 N.E. 948 (1922).
In DePaemelaere,the plaintiff deposited $26,000 in the defendant's safe, and upon
withdrawal of the money found that $10,000 was missing. 77 Misc. 2d at 2, 351 N.Y.S.2d at
809-10. As a result of the defendant's assertion that section 200 limited his liability, the
court was forced to evaluate whether the "notices of limitation of liability [were] conspicuously posted ...

so as to effect notice to the plaintiff .....

Id. at 3, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 810.

The defendant had "posted" a notice of limited liability on a 7- by 9-inch card at the righthand side of the registration desk. Id. at 4, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 811. Reasoning that "it was the
intention of the Legislature to see to it that real and effective notice of the hotel's limitation
of liability was given to its guests," and that the 7- by 9-inch card was not "conspicuous"
enough, the court concluded as a matter of law that the hotel was not entitled to statutory
protection. Id. at 4-5, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 812.
Similarly, in Holiday Inns, the Appellate Division, Third Department dismissed the
hotel's contention that its compliance with the posting requirement presented questions of
fact as being "without merit." 40 App. Div. 2d at 885, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 70. In that case, the
hotel had posted notices in some but not all public rooms. Id., 337 N.Y.S.2d at 69-70. This
attempt at statutory compliance was deemed inadequate as a matter of law because the
defendant hotel had not posted notice in "all public rooms." Id.
'_ See Zaldin v. Concord Hotel, 48 N.Y.2d 107, 114, 397 N.E.2d 370, 373, 421 N.Y.S.2d
858, 862 (1979). In Zaldin, two guests were denied access to a hotel's vault when they attempted to redeposit jewelry that had been removed earlier that evening. Id. at 113, 397
N.E.2d at 372, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 861. During the night, their room was burglarized and the
jewelry was stolen. Id. In determining the extent of the hotel's liability to the guests, the
Court evaluated whether a safe had been made available within the meaning of section 200.
Id. at 113-15, 397 N.E.2d at 372-74, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 862-63. Reasoning that on its face the
statute does not "distinguish between large and small inns, between those that cater to the
large convention and those that cater to the individual patron .... between those that have
wealthy clientele and those that do not," id. at 114, 397 N.E.2d at 373, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 862,
the Court determined as a matter of law that the presence of unique or mitigating circumstances should not be a factor in a court's evaluation of statutory compliance, id. Accordingly, by refusing to accept the plaintiffs' redeposit, the hotel technically was not providing
a "safe" to its guests and therefore could not avail itself of the statutory limitation of liability. Id. at 115, 397 N.E.2d at 374, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 863.
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prevalent under the common-law rule that an innkeeper stood as
an insurer of his patron's goods. 0 5 It is suggested that the Goncalves Court's grant of discretion to the jury to determine statutory compliance contravenes this legislative goal and inhibits the
beneficial operation of section 200.206 By submitting the question
of statutory compliance to the jury rather than judicially engrafting a precise definition onto the statute, the Court has vitiated the
predictability of statutory protection for an innkeeper who has attempted to provide a "safe" on his premises. 0 7 In light of these
undesirable ramifications, it is hoped that the New York courts
will reevaluate the decision to vest in the jury the determination of
205 See Millhiser v. Beau Site Co., 251 N.Y. 290, 294, 167 N.E. 447, 447 (1929); Dilkes v.
Hotel Sheraton, Inc., 282 App. Div. 488, 489, 125 N.Y.S.2d 38, 39 (1st Dep't 1953); Navagh,
supra note 178, at 63-64. The legislative intent in enacting section 200 was not to benefit
patrons by ensuring absolute protection of their valuables, but rather to protect innkeepers
from unlimited liability. See Millhiser, 251 N.Y. at 294, 167 N.E. at 447. Indeed, section 200
was enacted to remedy the disproportionate relationship that unlimited liability bears to the
amount of compensation received from guests. Navagh, supra note 178, at 63-64.
210 See Goncalves, 58 N.Y.2d at 224-25, 447 N.E.2d at 703, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 760 (Jasen,
J., dissenting); supra note 198. In arriving at a standard for juries to apply when evaluating
compliance with section 200, the majority distinguished State v. Stoner, 473 S.W.2d 363
(Mo. 1971), which was cited as support by the dissent. See 58 N.Y.2d at 218 n.3, 447 N.E.2d
at 699 n.3, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 756 n.3. In Stoner, the Supreme Court of Missouri held as a
matter of law that a coin receptacle in a pay telephone booth was a "safe" within the meaning of a statute prohibiting the forcible entrance into a "safe" for the purpose of obtaining
money. 473 S.W.2d at 368. The Goncalves dissent relied on Stoner as support for its contention that the defendant's safe satisfied the statutory requisites. 58 N.Y.2d at 225, 447
N.E.2d at 703, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 760 (Jasen, J., dissenting). The Goncalves majority distinguished Stoner by reasoning that the Missouri court was not concerned with protecting the
same interests as was the Goncalves Court. Id. at 218 n.3, 447 N.E.2d at 699 n.3, 460
N.Y.S.2d at 756 n.3. Hence, it is submitted, the Goncalves Court was premising its analysis
solely on whether the safe provided was adequate to protect a guest's valuables without
regard to the legislative goal of assuring limited liability to innkeepers. See Federal Ins. Co.
v. Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, 60 Misc. 2d 996, 997, 303 N.Y.S.2d 297, 299 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y.
County 1969) (purpose of section 200 is to protect hotel from undisclosed excessive
liability).
207 See Goncalves, 58 N.Y.2d at 223-24, 447 N.E.2d at 702, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 759 (Jasen,
J., dissenting). Judge Jasen observed in Goncalves:
[U]nder the majority's view, a bank of safe-deposit boxes contained in a sheetrock
room in a Buffalo hotel could be determined by a Buffalo jury to be a "safe"
within the meaning of the statute, thus limiting the hotel's liability to $500, while
the identical facility installed by an Albany hotel might be found by an Albany
jury not to be a "safe" within the meaning of the statute ....
Id. (Jasen, J., dissenting).
The Goncalves decision, it is submitted, frustrates the intended practicality and predictability in complying with the terms of section 200 by removing the possibility that a
uniform standard of statutory compliance will be enunciated for the purpose of providing
guidance to innkeepers in their efforts to limit their liability for patrons' goods.
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statutory compliance with the safe requirement and implement a
judicial construction as a matter of law. Such an approach, it is
submitted, would allow for the judicial establishment of definitive
confines within which to construe the word "safe," and would enable innkeepers to provide safes with some degree of certainty that
the statutory prescriptions are being satisfied.
Joanne Dantuono

